

A Pamphlet War: Colonialism versus Radical Nationalism in the Ionian Islands, 1848-1864

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ABSTRACT: In the early 1850s the vice chancellor of the Ionian University wrote a pamphlet supporting British colonial rule in the Ionian Islands, a British protectorate. He soon found himself embroiled in a vitriolic pamphlet war with an Ionian radical. This paper contextualises and scrutinises their pamphlets, producing a nuanced reading that augments our understanding of some of the tensions between mid-nineteenth-century British imperialism and Hellenic radical nationalism. It asks what can be added to current debates by elucidating the motivations and historical contingencies of certain individuals and their articulation of colonial subjectivities and power dynamics. It shows that the networks that formed the British world-system often depended on the principal protagonists and their overlapping interests, egos, alliances and antipathies and ways in which they expressed themselves in the press. It argues that a critical reading of their publications and personal histories complicates conventional narratives of 'oppressive coloniser' versus 'radical nationalist' and demonstrates that in the Ionian context divisions were not so clear-cut.

KEYWORDS: Ionian Islands; George Bowen; Greece; Protectorate; Pamphleteering; Imperialism



IN 1848 A CLASSICIST, travel writer and vice-chancellor of Corfu's Ionian University named George Bowen toured the Ionian Islands, a British protectorate. Joined by his friend the artist-poet Edward Lear, Bowen admired the landscapes and antiquities and was courteously entertained by Ionian Liberals, one of whom he would marry.¹ Bowen did not anticipate that in Cephalonia he would witness an anti-British riot that heralded a radical nationalist campaign for decolonisation, nor that he would consequently

¹ George Bowen, Journals 1847-1851, private archive.

become embroiled in a politically significant pamphlet war with Dracato Papanicolas, a prominent Ionian radical 'agitator'. This led to Bowen being expelled from the protectorate along with the Lord High Commissioner, Sir John Young.² Britain subsequently capitulated to radical demands, and in 1864 exited the Ionian Islands and ceded them to Greece.

This paper contextualises and scrutinises these pamphlets, producing a nuanced reading that augments our understanding of some of the tensions between mid-nineteenth-century British imperialism and Hellenic radical nationalism. British historiography has traditionally blamed Ionian unrest on a seditious radical minority stirring up a previously contented people, while Greek historiography has attributed it to national aspirations and dissatisfaction with the protectorate, and has generally been positive towards those who supported it and negative towards those who did not.³ Recent historians have broadened the debate with socio-economic, political, theoretical and trans-European dimensions.⁴ What, then, can be added by elucidating the motivations and historical contingencies of certain individuals and their articulation of colonial subjectivities and power dynamics? In his masterly survey *The Empire Project* John Darwin argues that the empire was less a hegemonic rule of the periphery by the centre, than the management of ever-shifting global networks and spheres of influence.⁵ This paper shows that many such networks depended on the principal protagonists and their overlapping interests, egos, alliances and antipathies and on how they expressed themselves in the press. It argues that a critical reading of their publications and personal histories complicates conventional narratives of 'oppressive

² Sir John Young (1807-1876), Anglo-Irish MP and Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852-1855), was appointed Lord High Commissioner of the Ionians in 1855 but recalled in 1859. He became Governor of New South Wales (1861-1867) and later Governor-General of Canada (1869-1872).

³ Maria Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities: The Ionian Islands in British Official Discourse; 1815-1864', PhD thesis, University College London, 2009. Paschalidi describes Bowen as Secretary to Lord Seaton; in fact, Bowen was University vice-chancellor under Seaton and Secretary to Henry Ward and John Young.

⁴ See, for example, Roderick Beaton and David Ricks's edited collection, with relevant contributions from Socrates D. Petmezas and Paschalis Kitromilides, among others: *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).

⁵ John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

coloniser' versus 'radical nationalist', and demonstrates that in the Ionian context divisions were not so clear-cut.

At the 1815 Treaty of Paris, the islands – previously colonised by Venice, then briefly occupied by Russia, Turkey and France – were granted autonomy with their own legislature and justice system, but Britain would provide military protection under the governorship of a Lord High Commissioner (LHC). From the start of the protectorate relations between the British and Ionians were troubled. Andrekos Varnava argues that almost every colonial venture was a search for an El Dorado or utopia destined for disappointment.⁶ Other scholars have been more circumspect, noting that British officials were ambivalent about the Ionians' place in the empire.⁷ Colonial Secretary Earl Grey believed that protection was more in Ionian than British interests 'and that it is upon their [Ionians'] continuing to value and to support it, that its being maintained must depend'.⁸ Bruce Knox, one of few historians to have studied Bowen's controversial role in the protectorate, proposes that Britain accepted the islands mainly to deny their use to some other power.⁹ By contrast, Darwin demonstrates that despite being small and commercially insignificant, the Ionians had huge geostrategic meaning, enabling Britain to keep a navy in the Eastern Mediterranean to watch the French and Russians; to protect Britain's rapidly expanding trade; and to bestride maritime routes to the Dardanelles, Egypt and India. 'The age of "free" trade', Darwin notes, 'was about to begin'.¹⁰

If gaining the Ionian Islands marked a significant increase in British power, governing and retaining them proved challenging. This was partly because their status was ambiguous. The Ionians were fellow Europeans, but this was not a semi-autonomous settler colony like Australia with strong ties to the mother country; nor was

⁶ Andrekos Varnava, ed., *Imperial Expectations and Realities: El Dorados, Utopias and Dystopias* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015).

⁷ Evangelos Zorokastos, 'From Observatory to Dominion: Geopolitics, Colonial Knowledge and the Origins of the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1797-1822', PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 2018, p. 2.

⁸ Grey Papers, 13 August 1849, qtd in Dracato Papanicolas, *The Ionian Islands* (London: Ridgway, 1851), p. 126.

⁹ Bruce Knox, 'British Policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864', *English Historical Review*, 99.392 (1984), 503-529 (p. 505).

¹⁰ Darwin, p. 27.

it an extractive state exploiting slave labour like in the Caribbean where Westminster exercised more direct authority. One problem was the Paris Treaty's wording, which did not specify how far protection should extend, and the more power the British tried to wield, the more resistance they excited.¹¹ In 1855 LHC John Young complained that the Ionians were 'one of the very few, if not the sole dependency of the Crown which views with suspicion and dislike the terms of its connection with England'.¹² In her study of Ionian radicalism, Eleni Calligas summarises the relationship as 'one of mutual mistrust'.¹³

During Bowen's island tour this mistrust emerged as anti-British nationalism. Bowen was hosted in Cephalonia by the hospitable British Resident Charles Sebright, Baron D'Everton, and before midnight on 21 April 1848 they stood on the Residency balcony to watch the procession for Good Friday's Service of Lamentation, Orthodoxy's most emotive event.¹⁴ The Archbishop processed ahead of a flower-decked bier bearing an icon of the dead Christ, while the clergy chanted dirges and Cephalonia's most respected citizens followed solemnly behind. Traditionally the Archbishop paused outside the Residency to offer a prayer for Queen Victoria, and Bowen and the Baron stood ready to receive this grateful tribute, but at mention of the Queen's name an anti-British 'mob' started hissing and shoving. Police tried to keep order, but were stampeded almost into the harbour, along with the clergy and the Archbishop himself. The Archbishop insisted on continuing with the loyal prayer, so the radicals punished him by locking him out of his cathedral and forcing him to strip off his robes ignominiously in the street. The 'despotic' Baron had thirty-three Cephalonians arrested.¹⁵

Bowen dismissed the riot as a 'little fracas', but he underestimated the growing strength of popular resentment. 1848 was the decisive year when revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity spread from the rest of Europe to the Ionians, and

¹¹ Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 16.

¹² Young to Labouchere, 1 Dec 1855, British Library, BM Add MS. 62940.

¹³ Eleni Calligas, 'The "Rizospastai" (Radical-Unionists): Politics and Nationalism in the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864', PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 1994, p. 39.

¹⁴ Bowen, Journals, 21 April 1848.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 22 April 1848.

volatile Cephalonia, a poor island riven by family feuds and social discontent, saw increasingly violent uprisings. In 1849 LHC Henry Ward tried to stem the bloodshed by clamping down with martial law, a rare step in the British Empire, particularly for a former Whig MP. Ward dispatched 900 British troops who ransacked houses and rounded up innocent people. Around 80 perpetrators were flogged with cat-o-nine-tails, others banished without trial, and twenty-one executed.¹⁶ The unprecedented severity 'brought much odium on Ward's head and made most Cephalonians thoroughly Anglophobe'.¹⁷

When radical anti-British ideas in the Ionian and Greek press were translated and echoed in British papers, the debate spread from periphery to metropole. Much of mid-nineteenth-century Europe was exploding with a plethora of pamphlets, periodicals, weeklies, dailies and quarterlies, making this 'a profoundly textual era' and 'a new media moment' as significant as the arrival of the internet and social media.¹⁸ This was thanks to immense cultural and technological changes, but in the Ionians it was also due to liberalisation of censorship laws. After the 1848 riots Lord Seaton, Ward's predecessor as LHC, did not clamp down like Austria's authoritarian Hapsburg regime in Italy and Austria but instead granted sweeping constitutional reforms. Elements of press freedom had been introduced elsewhere in the empire such as in India in 1835, and it had caused a furore in the Cape Colony in the 1820s when used to expose the corruption of governor Lord Charles Somerset.¹⁹ In the Ionians it unleashed a long-suppressed hunger for print, with numerous new publications scrutinising the British authorities, criticising institutions, reporting on European revolutions and articulating radical ideas.²⁰ Ward felt compelled to exonerate himself. In 1851 publisher John Murray received a proposal for a pamphlet, explaining that events had drawn attention to these

¹⁶ Ward to Grey, 17 September 1849, Colonial Office Archives, National Library, CO 136/132.

¹⁷ Michael Pratt, *Britain's Greek Empire* (London: Rex Collings, 1978) p. 135.

¹⁸ Innes Keighren, Charles Withers and Bill Bell, *Travels into Print: Exploration, Writing, and Publishing with John Murray, 1773-1859* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 8; Elizabeth Miller, 'Reading in Review: The Victorian Book Review in the New Media Moment', *Victorian Periodicals Review*, 49.4 (2016), 626-642 (p. 626).

¹⁹ J.M. MacKenzie, 'To Enlighten South Africa': The Creation of a Free Press at the Cape in the Early Nineteenth Century' in *Media and the British Empire*, ed. by C. Kaul (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pp. 20-36 (p. 21).

²⁰ Calligas, p. 111.

relatively unknown islands, but that the ignorance displayed needed correcting.²¹ This marked the beginning of the pamphlet war with which this paper is principally concerned.

The proposal claimed that the pamphlet would

contain much curious, original and important information – both with regard to this country and to the state of the Levant in general, as I have had access to all the archives and official documents of every sort. Besides, my local knowledge is infinitely greater than that of any other writer on the subject.²²

Although pamphleteering allowed individuals the freedom to be more scurrilous, abusive and seditious – or more detailed, serious and ‘highbrow’ – than newspapers and periodicals, John Murray believed newspapers had overtaken the pamphlet’s intellectual role so he declined the proposal.²³ It was accepted instead by James Ridgway, a radical publisher noted for his stand on socio-political issues.²⁴ The pamphlet was entitled *The Ionian Islands Under British Protection* (1851). According to the accepted norm, it was anonymous to protect the author from charges of sedition (punishable by life imprisonment), but George Bowen, the University’s vice-chancellor, was swiftly outed as the writer.²⁵ A fulminating riposte appeared, entitled *The Ionian Islands; What they have lost and suffered under the thirty-five years’ administration of the Lord High Commissioners sent to govern them* (1851). The anonymous author was a London-based Ionian lawyer-merchant named George Dracato Papanicolas, who campaigned for the Islands mainly in the radical *Daily News* and Peelite *Morning Chronicle*, and who Bowen identified as Ward’s principal assailant in the press. Papanicolas was also published by Ridgway, presumably a commercial decision because now a pamphlet war – good for sales - was underway.

The pamphleteers appear to exemplify the oppositional narrative of ‘oppressive coloniser’ versus ‘radical nationalist’. While Bowen wrote to support British policy and

²¹ Bowen to Murray, 6 Jan 1851, John Murray Archive, MS.40136.

²² Ibid.

²³ George Orwell, *British Pamphleteers*, I (London: Alan Wingate, 1948), p. 7; Murray to Hobhouse, 2 Oct. 1844, JMA, MS.41911, 188.

²⁴ Ralph Manogue, ‘James Ridgway and America’, *Early American Literature*, 31.3 (1996), 264-288.

²⁵ Papanicolas, p. 4.

educate readers in what he considered the truth, Papanicolas claimed he wrote to arouse metropolitan sympathy for those suffering the 'cruelties and tyrannies' perpetrated by the British on this imperial outpost. He argued that the Ionian people had moral justice on their side and were supported by British public opinion: 'all that remains for us to do is to influence that opinion as far as possible, by publishing our remonstrances in the English language'.²⁶ Thus both authors manipulated the press to their advantage.

The level of vitriol was extreme. Papanicolas denounced Bowen's 'splenetic attack', calling it 'equally malicious, equally false, and, worse than all, equally dull'.²⁷ Papanicolas's own pamphlet was wittier; he branded Bowen a 'pamphleteering pedagogue' and 'an unripe scholar - of a pedantry that reaches almost a dandyism of philological classicality [...] and the laughing-stock of English as well as Ionian society in Corfu'.²⁸ Papanicolas called Bowen a liar, signing off:

You have flourished in newspapers, and spat your spite in pamphlets – you have abused us; in fact, you have done everything but what we pay you to do - *instruct our youth*. May I recommend that you eschew politics and try teaching. [...] If there be any sight in nature more disgusting than a drunken woman, it is that of a *political schoolmaster*.²⁹

Bowen accused Papanicolas of being a radical mouthpiece, and Papanicolas retaliated with a libel suit. Bowen unearthed flimsy evidence to prove his case and submitted a Plea of Justification, claiming that his crime was outweighed by the public benefit of exposing Papanicolas as an 'avowed correspondent' of seditious anti-British Ionians.³⁰ Although Papanicolas was forced to drop the charge, he continued to abuse Bowen in the press almost until he died in 1862.

In many ways, Bowen's pamphlet is evidence of his perpetuation of an oppressive colonial ideology: it reads like a typically Saidian Orientalist text, replete with stereotypes and patronising superiority, even declaring that 'all Orientals have much in

²⁶ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 144, 112.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 29, 142. Bowen acknowledged receipt of Papanicolas's pamphlet. Bowen to Gladstone, 20 February 1852, Gladstone Papers, British Library, Add. MSS, 44371, fos. 194-7.

²⁹ Papanicolas, p. 158.

³⁰ Bowen to Murray, 21 February 1853, JMA, MS.40136.

common with children; they are always either in ecstasy or misery'.³¹ For theorists like Homi K. Bhabha such rhetoric is central to colonial discourse, denoting megalomania or paranoia that produces imagined constructions of cultural and national alterity, which were used to define Britain's self-image by creating a contrasting other in order to propagate imperialism.³² Bowen underlined the superiority of British institutions by repeating the construction of Ionian identity familiar in British colonial discourse as diminished from its classical glory by 400 years of corruption and misrule by Venice.³³ He construed the Ionians as politically naive and dependent on the British to teach them how to govern themselves, articulating the civilising mission – 'the real moral warrant of Victorian imperialism' – that was shared across Britain's outposts and at home.³⁴ As their chief educator he embodied that relationship. However, Bowen declared, Ionian insolence had undermined British protection and stirred up Hellenic sentiment and discontent.³⁵ He cited 'ardent radical' Panagin Xidian, Cephalonia's new head of Public Instruction, testing the proficiency of village pupils by asking them to write: 'The Turks ought to be driven out of the Greek provinces on the mainland, and the English out of the Ionian Islands by the united efforts of the whole Greek race'.³⁶ Bowen felt personally and patriotically insulted.

Papanicolas retaliated by accusing Bowen of insulting the Ionian character as 'degenerating from our ancestors' and libelling the country.³⁷ He resisted Bowen's paternalism, sneering at his 'ever-ready cane for the little boys (the Ionians), and the polite praise and perpetual goodness of the fathers and mothers and guardians (the English officials)'.³⁸ Indeed, the way Papanicolas deconstructed Bowen's assumptions, motivations and modes of discourse and interrogated the implications of Anglo-Ionian power relationships makes it tempting to frame him as a proto-postcolonial critic, writing nearly 130 years before Said.

³¹ Bowen, *The Ionian Islands Under British Protection (IIUBP)*, p. 122.

³² Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Oxford: Routledge, 1994).

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁴ Darwin, p. 61.

³⁵ Bowen, *IIUBP*, p. 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

³⁷ Papanicolas, pp. 4, 158.

³⁸ Papanicolas, p. 4. Parentheses in original.

Nonetheless, despite the jousting, the conflict between 'colonial oppressor' and 'radical nationalist' was more nuanced than appears. Bowen admitted that foreign rule never inspired universal good-will, but argued with some justification that the English administration, whatever its defects, was the best government in the Mediterranean. Mainland Greeks frequently appealed for British protection from pirates which their own government could not supply, and after the Cephalonian riots Ward was thanked for restoring order by many leading Ionians.³⁹ This speaks to the complexity of Ionian politics, which varied from island to island, class to class and family to family. The landed feudal elite, particularly conservatives with vested interests keen to retain their grip on power, were generally pro-British. Papanicolas belonged to a more progressive circle of Ionian intellectuals, lawyers and politicians, many of whom had been educated abroad and active in Europe's political upheavals since the 1830s, returning home radicalised. This influential Liberal circle campaigned for extended suffrage, socio-political and economic reform, and press freedom after years of censorship, with the long-term goal of independent self-representation under Westminster's umbrella, like in New Zealand and Australia.⁴⁰ However, in Cephalonia more extreme radical nationalists, many of them ambitious but frustrated middle-class professionals, were emerging from their ranks. While Papanicolas and his cohort came to be seen as 'old' reformist liberals or radicals, he termed this new breed 'ultra liberals'.⁴¹ They demanded not constitutional reforms that would pacify the population into maintaining the status quo, but socialist politics and national self-determination that stipulated an end to the protectorate altogether, and *enosis*, union with Greece.⁴²

Papanicolas dropped his libel case, but argued that far from being a seditious radical, he had in fact been repudiated by the radicals for his moderation.⁴³ His stance was further complicated by the fact that while he attacked the protectorate's governance and even questioned the 1815 Paris Treaty's validity, thereby challenging the protectorate's moral and practical foundations, he simultaneously denied being

³⁹ Ward to Grey, 3 April 1850, CO 136/135; D'Everton to Ward, 19 Oct 1851, CO 136/140; Ward to Grey, 16 September 1849, CO 136/132.

⁴⁰ Bowen, *IIIUBP*, p. 31.

⁴¹ Papanicolas, p. 126.

⁴² Calligas, pp. 77, 103, 143.

⁴³ Papanicolas, p. 121.

anti-British or even anti-colonial. Indeed, Papanicolas conceded that he had benefited from British colonialism in being a protégé of the philhellenic Lord Guilford, who founded the Ionian University of which Bowen was vice-chancellor, and where, ironically, many anti-British pro-*enosis* views were formulated. Papanicolas agreed with the 'ultra liberals' that 'the Ionian Islands in "bonds" to Great Britain, and side by side with Greece a free kingdom, are a visible anachronism', but he rejected their confrontational tactics and uncompromising opposition to the protectorate.⁴⁴ Although Papanicolas resisted Bowen's patronising superiority, he nevertheless trusted that under Britain's shelter Ionian commerce would expand, institutions flourish, and education increase.⁴⁵ This seems contradictory, but as Holland and Markides argue, the notion of Britain as an idealised Greek patron, manifested by British support for the War of Independence and financial and political involvement in the foundation of the new Greek kingdom, was central to ongoing Anglo-Greek relations.⁴⁶

Indeed, it was not British colonialism that Papanicolas opposed so much as maladministration by the 'pestiferous' individual bureaucrats sent to rule over them. As he expostulated:

Mr. Bowen is a fresh leech. He is new at his work; but just come over amongst us; and can bite and suck freely at his salary, supposing all the while that he is doing the patient good. The old leeches of the Bureaucracy, however, know better. They find the draught comes slowly, that the patient is exhausted, and, therefore, they are getting ready to drop off.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, even this insult is not as straightforward as it seems, because Bowen credited leeching with saving his life when he nearly died of malaria in Athens in 1848. To Bowen leeches symbolised recovery. Britain, he hoped, would continue to cure the Ionians of corruption and folly as long as was deemed necessary, before departing. This signals the complexity of imperial politics, wherein the colonial versus radical dichotomy did not always run along national lines but was disrupted by the individual personalities and politics that were woven into the global network of influence in

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁶ Holland and Markides, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Papanicolas, p. 136.

Britain's world-system, as Darwin outlines. Papanicolas blamed Ward for inciting unrest, for example, but Bowen claimed Papanicolas was seeking revenge on Ward for humiliating him by refusing him a job.⁴⁸ Bowen blamed the unrest on the Ionian press, accusing it of inciting seditious pro-Hellenic and anti-British radical sentiments with 'unfair' and 'pert' insults that in Ireland – currently embroiled in the militant separatist Young Ireland movement – would have had the authors clapped in gaol.⁴⁹ Papanicolas attributed this to Bowen's revenge on journalists who had humiliated and ridiculed him for publishing a pedantic and patronising Greek grammar.⁵⁰

Bowen's criticism was aimed chiefly at the man who liberalised Ionian censorship laws and therefore allowed these debates to take place: Lord Seaton, Ward's predecessor as LHC. Bowen conceded that constitutional reforms were necessary, but declared Seaton's to be 'crude and injudicious', going further than the most ardent demagogue had hoped.⁵¹ It is a paradox that Bowen, a liberal-leaning don, should deride the liberal reforms of a Tory general. Indeed, the reforms were surprising for a Peninsular War veteran and later Field Marshal: many of Wellington's generals were employed as colonial governors and most were anxious to prevent the spread of seditious European Jacobinism. However, Bowen also detested Seaton personally, perhaps because Seaton thwarted his intentions towards Seaton's daughter.⁵² Bowen criticised Seaton for enacting his reforms in a flurry before he resigned, leaving Ward to pick up the pieces; Papanicolas criticised Ward for trying to reverse Seaton's reforms.⁵³ To support Ward Bowen sneered at Seaton's use of Greek, claiming it was unused by 'the gentlemen of Corfu [...] [except] as a badge of national, that is, of *anti-English* sentiments.'⁵⁴ Papanicolas scoffed at the contradiction that a man should dismiss a language he was paid to teach in a university founded to foster its use.⁵⁵

Yet Bowen's position was as complicated as Papanicolas's, and his negative stereotyping was contradicted by his genuine love of Hellenic culture: 'We envy neither

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 2; Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 89.

⁴⁹ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 112.

⁵⁰ Papanicolas, p. 144.

⁵¹ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 60.

⁵² Bowen, Journals, 1 October 1848.

⁵³ Papanicolas, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 47.

⁵⁵ Papanicolas, p. 48.

the head nor heart of the man [...] who is ever seeking for motes in the bright eye of Hellas. For our own part we love the country and the race'.⁵⁶ Papanicolas dismissed this as hypocrisy, but an intertextual reading of Bowen's pamphlet and journals demonstrates that his passion was genuine, and surpassed conventional nineteenth-century admiration.⁵⁷ He did not share the disappointment of many philhellenes on encountering the realities of modern Greece, and instead he often connected across socio-cultural boundaries with sympathy and respect.⁵⁸ He travelled throughout Greece and European Turkey (today's northern Greece), wrote the scholarly *Murray Handbook to Greece* with a fresh emphasis on modern history, married an Ionian, and was proud of his fluent modern Greek.⁵⁹ While his love of Greece did not necessarily preclude a colonial perspective, this does demonstrate a complicated relationship that nuances the purely oppositional narrative.

Apparent contradictions in Bowen's pamphlet are further explained by his conflicted identity as both representative of an increasingly oppressive power and life-long champion of Greek national liberty. His earliest memory was of the Greek and allied triumph at the 1827 Battle of Navarino that brought the Greek state into being, which he believed triggered his passion for Greece.⁶⁰ As such, he was a mid-century heir to the Romantics, whose contribution to Greek independence and the emerging ideology of nationalism was based on ancient Greek culture, philosophy and politics.⁶¹ Yet Bowen supported Greek nationalism when it meant ousting the Ottomans, but not when it challenged the British.

Additional contradictions were caused by the fact that Bowen was writing less what he believed than what he was paid to write. In his private journals, for example, he eulogised the bloodless 1843 constitutional coup in Athens as the epitome of liberalism, praising it for limiting the powers of autocratic King Otto and introducing a

⁵⁶ Bowen, *IIUBP*, p. 141.

⁵⁷ Papanicolas p. 16. In his journals Bowen wrote frequently of his love and sympathy for Greece and reprimanded those who spoke against it.

⁵⁸ Papanicolas, p. 105.

⁵⁹ See Helena Drysdale, 'George Bowen and his 1854 Handbook to Greece', *Romance, Revolution and Reform*, 4 (2022) 10-34.

⁶⁰ Bowen, Journals, 23 August 1847.

⁶¹ Roderick Beaton, 'Introduction', in *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, pp. 1-18 (p. 3).

degree of democratic representative government in Greece. Ironically, however, although the coup was reputedly orchestrated by the British, its effect was to encourage anti-British dissent in the Ionians because it made union with Greece a more attractive prospect for those whose own constitution was condemned even by their own LHC Lord Seaton as 'indefensible'.⁶² Rather than protecting the Ionians, Britain had come to seem like 'the frustrater of national aspirations'.⁶³ Consequently, for all his private enthusiasm, in his pamphlet Bowen supported Ward's anti-radicalism by decrying the 1843 Athens coup as 'imported from the manufactories of [...] Bentham, and such-like liberty-mongers'.⁶⁴ Thus he was pulled in opposing directions by his Romantic liberal sensibility, and his need to serve imperial elements of his career as the protectorate's mouthpiece.

Power dynamics between Bowen and Papanicolas – 'protector' and 'protected' - were further blurred by the way each manifested a combination of inferiority and superiority. Thomas Gallant examines reciprocal Anglo-Ionian misunderstandings and misrepresentations, making analogies with British treatment of the Irish: both presented a dilemma for their rulers in being white, Christian Europeans – neither entirely 'us' nor 'them' - and both were stereotyped as heavy drinkers, idle, mendacious and violent.⁶⁵ The analogy seems apt for Bowen, who was born in Donegal, son of an Anglican vicar, so arguably part of the colonial elite in Ireland as well as in the Ionians. However, Bowen's journals reveal that his relatively humble upbringing gave him an inferiority complex, which Papanicolas exploited by mocking his Hibernian pronunciation of Greek.⁶⁶ Bowen was conscious that although he held a position of authority in the Ionians, his own culture was outshone by the glories of ancient Greece, and Papanicolas exploited this too: 'To hear this pedant prate to us about liberty, one would think that

⁶² Pratt, p. 131.

⁶³ Pratt, p. 155.

⁶⁴ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 32.

⁶⁵ Thomas Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and Power in the Mediterranean* (Paris: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

⁶⁶ Papanicolas, p. 114. Bowen had nothing good to say about the 'Green Isle', and having been educated in England considered himself English. He described an evening in the Athens Agora with a Greek officer who had been ADC to King Otto and who spent two hours bemoaning Greece's present conditions. Bowen reflected on the irony that his own humble country was unheard of when Greece was at its height. Journals, 14 August 1848.

the Greeks had not known it before the first Celt had risen from the mist and mud of his early birth – had never fought for and won it with their blood, even within the last quarter of a century'.⁶⁷ Thus Papanicolas compared Ireland's continued colonial subjugation to Britain with Greece's triumphant liberation after the 1821-27 War of Independence, a touchstone of Greek national pride. At the same time, Papanicolas complained that the British elite took all the best jobs and made the Ionians feel inferior, but when Bowen snobbishly dismissed him as 'brother of a shopkeeper at Corfu', Papanicolas retorted that his family lacked estates but was 'of the purest Greek blood,' having proudly resided in Leukadia for 380 years and previously on the Greek mainland.⁶⁸

All of this points towards their nuanced relationships with Greek nationalism, which lay at the heart of the debate but also helped to bridge disparities between them. Knox argues that 'one can hardly overstate the degree of incomprehension with which 1850s Englishmen encountered "nationalism", if by that we mean something apparently distinct from some desire to achieve a free constitutional system'.⁶⁹ However, Bowen was unusual in not only understanding but sympathising with Hellenic nationalism. He recognised that most Ionians considered themselves Greek 'in the three chief elements of nationality, — in blood, religion and language'.⁷⁰ This was a relatively new construction of 'homeland' not as birthplace but as a more amorphous imagined political community, as famously configured by Benedict Anderson.⁷¹ However, there were subtleties in Ionian relationships with Greek nationalism which complicated the radical nationalist stance. Many leading pro-Greek Ionian radicals were Hellenised Venetians, some of whom spoke Italian as their mother tongue, while Greek – still largely the language of landless peasants, particularly in Corfu, and not the official

⁶⁷ Papanicolas, p. 63.

⁶⁸ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 88; Papanicolas, p. 114.

⁶⁹ Bruce Knox, 'The British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1847-1859, and the Dispersion of a Foreign Elite', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 10.1/2 (2000), 107-124 (pp. 111-12).

⁷⁰ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 126.

⁷¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991).

Ionian language until 1851 – was itself divided into formal Katharevousa and popular Dimotiki.⁷²

If language was not a straightforward element of Greek nationalism, neither was religion, and Bowen understood this too. Unlike many European radicals, the Ionians equated their church not with political oppression but with national emancipation. As Holland and Markides note, British prestige and Hellenic nationalism both 'fed on a diet of symbols conducive to their respective senses of power and authority'.⁷³ That Bowen recognised this was demonstrated when, on visiting the prisoners after the Good Friday riot, he advised the Baron that it would be diplomatic to try them not for impugning British sovereignty but for insulting their own religion, an offence in the Ionian penal code generally punishable by excommunication.⁷⁴ However, Bowen misunderstood the nuances. When the Greek kingdom severed ties with the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1833, influential and often radical Ionian priests chose union with Greece and the new autocephalous Greek church, while the Archbishops and Bishops remained with the protectorate and the Patriarch. Therefore, it was not their own church that the radicals insulted but the Archbishop himself, who was a detested British appointment. By humiliating the Archbishop the radicals paradoxically upheld their church's dignity and independence and garnered more respect from their compatriots.⁷⁵

Bowen's response to radical nationalism was influenced by personal experience. After the 1848 Good Friday uprising Bowen travelled to Austria and was trapped in the Siege of Vienna. His is the only first-hand English account, and it was published in the *Times*.⁷⁶ Appalled by what he saw as the savagery of the radical 'mob', he feared similar violence spreading to the Ionians and believed certain restrictions were necessary for peace. 'Now in Germany, France & Italy, the wisest and best friends of the people are owning what shame & sorrow that even liberty must be sacrificed to preserve civilization', he wrote.⁷⁷ Bowen privately deplored the gunboat diplomacy manifested

⁷² Socrates D. Petmezas, 'From Privileged Outcasts to Power Players: The 'Romantic' Redefinition of the Hellenic Nation in the Mid-Nineteenth Century' in *The Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 123-36 (p. 127).

⁷³ Holland and Markides, p. 18.

⁷⁴ Thomas Gallant, 'Peasant Ideology and Excommunication for a Crime in a Colonial Context: The Ionian Islands (Greece), 1817-1864', *Journal of Social History*, 23.3 (1990), 485-512 (p. 487).

⁷⁵ Calligas, p. 88.

⁷⁶ 'The State of Vienna', *Times*, 22 November 1848, p. 5.

⁷⁷ Bowen, Journal, 26 October 1848.

in the notorious 1850 Don Pacifico affair, but shared Palmerston's desire to maintain Europe's balance of power. Darwin argues that Palmerston was full of bluster but actually nervous of events in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, his first priority being to preserve the 1815 gains and the geopolitical equilibrium and prevent the rise of European hegemony, particularly of France.⁷⁸ Britain provided stability in the Mediterranean that, if shaken, could cause all of Europe to tremble.⁷⁹ Bowen recommended a clampdown in the Ionians like in Austria:

There are two points which should never be lost sight of in dealing with a large portion of this people. 1. That they hate the English Government. 2. That they fear it. It is only by working on the latter feeling that the effects of the former can be counteracted. A foreign Government can never seek to be loved without putting itself first into a condition to be respected.⁸⁰

While this exemplifies the 'oppressive coloniser' trope, it is interesting to note how strongly Bowen's attitude was influenced by his own experience as well as his ideological commitments. Bowen was also afraid for his own future: threats to the protectorate could cost him if not his life then his job – as it transpired.

Their differences notwithstanding, Bowen and Papanicolas were united in endorsing the popular rhetoric that modern inhabitants of greater Greece descended from ancient Greeks. Despite his experience in Vienna, Bowen remained sympathetic towards Greek nationalism, partly because Greek and Ionian radicals differed from their revolutionary European counterparts in not trying to forge a new society but instead espousing a conscious restoration of a civilisation two thousand years old – one Bowen deeply admired.⁸¹ The notion of reinvention underpinned the irredentist *Megali Idea*, the great idea to reunite all Hellenic peoples, which lay at the heart of the Greek

⁷⁸ Darwin, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London: Penguin, 2013).

⁸⁰ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 139.

⁸¹ Beaton, p. 3. Beaton contextualises Greek exceptionalism and the marginalisation of modern Greece in the historiography of European nationalism. See also Effi Gazi, 'Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece' in *The Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 95-106.

kingdom's foreign policy.⁸² Both Bowen and Papanicolas supported the desire for 'national regeneration', which had survived 400 years of 'shame and slavery' under Ottoman and Venetian rule, and which Bowen believed was as intense as the Jewish desire for Israel.⁸³ However, that too was muddled by individual approaches. Bowen feared it was being used by the Greek government to 'foment insurrection,' and he distinguished the 'natural and laudable aspiration for a union of all Greeks into one Greek state' from 'the morbid clamour for immediate annexation to the existing kingdom of Greece. The latter is the cry of a faction; the former is the inevitable instinct of nationality'.⁸⁴ Papanicolas denied King Otto's involvement in Ionian unrest, but echoed Bowen's distinction between factionalism and nationality, albeit using different terminology. Indeed the *Megali Idea* was subject to different Ionian interpretations and disagreements: while some radical unionists sought the establishment of a pan-Hellenic government based on the principle of equality, which would therefore be republican and involve deposing King Otto, others disagreed. Papanicolas did not make his views clear, but both parties concurred that the Greek monarchy was a foreign imposition, and any future form of government should be determined by the people themselves.⁸⁵

For all his anti-radical bluster, Bowen proposed a surprising solution to the Ionian question which traversed the boundary between 'colonial oppressor' and 'radical nationalist'. Lord John Russell had previously criticised the Ionians as a source of irritation and expense and proposed handing them to Austria.⁸⁶ Bowen's suggestion was more finely drawn. He argued that Britain should accept that it had lost legitimacy and power and should satisfy the Greek spirit of nationality by surrendering the southern islands – 'broken fragments of Hellas' – to Greece. Meanwhile, he proposed annexing the more northerly and stable Venice/Albania-orientated Corfu, the British administrative base, as a full-blown British colony along with Paxos.⁸⁷ This would remove the 'troublesome' nationalists in the southern islands, while as colonies Corfu

⁸² Paschalis Kitromilides, 'Paradigm Nation: The Study of Nationalism and the 'Canonization' of Greece' in *The Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 21-31 (p. 26).

⁸³ Bowen, *IUBP*, pp. 126, 131.

⁸⁴ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 126.

⁸⁵ Calligas, p. 300.

⁸⁶ Grey to Russell, 9 May 1848, Grey Papers, Durham University, GRE/B122/4/36; Russell to Grey, 9 May 1848, GRE/B122/4/35; Russell to Grey, 15 May 1848, GRE/B122/4/37.

⁸⁷ Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 127.

and Paxos 'would be enriched by the English capitalists and settlers' and have privileged access to British markets, while their citizens would be allowed into British professions and the military. Meanwhile Britain would retain its strategic base and commercial hub.⁸⁸ However, Bowen accepted that this plan was unlikely to be accepted by the other Great Powers, given that according to the Paris Treaty England had to deal with the islands as a whole or not at all.

If by recognising and submitting to radical nationalism Bowen's proposal complicates his role as colonial oppressor, Papanicolas's response is equally unexpected. Far from seizing the opportunity to liberate the Ionians, he was appalled. This was not because he opposed the plan to divide up the Ionian Islands, nor the plan to annexe Corfu, but because although he sympathised with 'ultra liberals' and supported the *Megali Idea*, the reality of union with Greece was not appealing. As if he and Bowen had exchanged roles, he fumed:

Does he [Bowen] suppose that a population of 260,000, far in advance, whether wealth, commerce, or civilization be considered, of the new kingdom of Greece, are willing to unite themselves for the present to a nation of yet undeveloped resources, overwhelmed with debts?⁸⁹

Papanicolas predicted that by joining the Greek state the Ionians would turn into a provincial backwater. He and other 'old' reformist radicals sought independence, not severance, and constitutional reform under Britain's aegis that would, when the time was right, lead to *enosis*.⁹⁰ The difference between them and the radical unionists was how and when to achieve it. 'The question can only be one of time, convenience, and prudence', he argued.⁹¹ In that sense Papanicolas and Bowen agreed. As Bowen put it so sonorously, 'The long silent voice of patriotism and nationality is heard once more [...] Such are the feelings,—noble and generous in themselves,—on which the agitators have so successfully worked to excite their countrymen against foreign rule'.⁹² But while

⁸⁸ Ibid.; Paschalidi, p. 278.

⁸⁹ Papanicolas, p. 155.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 121.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 126.

⁹² Bowen, *IUBP*, p. 31.

Bowen proposed a solution that appeared to be both a capitulation and a power grab, Papanicolas took a more cautious approach of watching and waiting.

At first sight, reaction to the pamphlets seemed to run along British-coloniser-versus-Ionian-radical lines. Bowen's pamphlet was read in the Ionian Islands where he was satirised in the press for his presumption and pomposity, the satires helpfully translated by Papanicolas in his pamphlet.⁹³ Meanwhile Bowen told Murray that British officials in the Ionians had thanked him for establishing 'the case of truth and English policy' in the Levant, an opinion shared by Lord Stratford (Stratford Canning) as well as former LHC Howard Douglas 'and other good judges in England'.⁹⁴ Bowen's pamphlet was quoted in parliament by Colonial Secretary John Pakington in defence of Ward and British policy; Bowen boasted that it had become 'quite the text book of the Colonial Office on the subject'.⁹⁵ However, these boundaries were not clear-cut because Britain's pluralistic society had always included an anti-imperialist minority; Papanicolas's pamphlet was also favourably quoted in parliament by radical MP Joseph Hume, who had visited the Ionians and since the 1820s had been vocal in attacks on the imperial establishment and 'old corruption'.⁹⁶ Ward had offered \$1000 for the leading insurgents, dead or alive, which caused outrage as this was contrary to the English presumption of innocence, and Hume nicknamed him 'Dead or Alive Ward'.⁹⁷ Hume likened Ward to the despotic Hapsburgs, and echoed Papanicolas in demanding that the government send out a commission of enquiry into Ward's actions.⁹⁸

Other responses were not straightforward and underline the power of both the press and the interplay of individual egos and ambitions in the broader network of the British world-system. Pamphlets were seldom reviewed, but John Murray, who was creating space in the publishing market to reach as wide an audience as possible, reinforced Bowen's position in the colonial establishment by commissioning a glowing 37-page reprise of his pamphlet in the prestigious *Quarterly Review*.⁹⁹ The review was

⁹³ Papanicolas, pp. 145-150.

⁹⁴ Bowen to Murray, 8 December 1852, JMA, MS.40136.

⁹⁵ Hansard, HC Deb 05 April 1852 vol 120 cc718-34; Bowen to Murray, 22 April 1852, JMA, MS.40136.

⁹⁶ Zoe Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-1845: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 42.

⁹⁷ Hansard, HC Deb 09 August 1850 vol 113 cc976-1005, p. 998.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁹⁹ 'Ionian Administration', *Quarterly Review*, xci, September 1852.

anonymous, according to the norm. Anonymous reviewing was criticised for permitting dishonest 'puffing' for friends' books, which led Victorian critics to adopt 'a disinterested, impersonal voice to ward off doubts about critical impartiality'.¹⁰⁰ The *Quarterly* review included one criticism: that the pamphlet's author had drawn too positive a portrait of the Ionian population, while the *Times* had published a 'sterner but truer' picture: 'We took under our aegis a people who combined Italian crime with Greek cunning; who were strangers to private honesty or public virtue; who were remarkable for strong passions, dark superstitions, ignorance and laziness'.¹⁰¹ However, Bowen's discussions with Murray and receipt of £35 from editor John Lockhart reveal that the reviewer was none other than Bowen himself.¹⁰² Far from guaranteeing his objectivity, anonymity provided a mask behind which he could promote his pamphlet and lend it the *Quarterly's* authority. The *Times* article was also anonymous, but the style, tone, content and rhetoric are familiar: Papanicolas was convinced the author was Bowen.¹⁰³

As we have seen, Bowen used the press to pursue a vendetta not only against Papanicolas and Ionian journalists, but also against Seaton, his former employer. He undermined Seaton's reforms in order to support Ward's attempt to reverse them, arguing that they were a knee-jerk reaction to the 1848 uprisings and a last-minute bid for popularity that left Ward to pick up the pieces. Calligas refutes Bowen's accusation, arguing that Seaton's reforms linked in with the agenda for devolved representative self-government on the Westminster model that he had brought from Canada where he had previously been Governor, and were designed to appease the reformist radicals like Papanicolas and shore up the protectorate.¹⁰⁴ Knox on the other hand calls Bowen's criticisms intemperate but deserved.¹⁰⁵ There is truth in both interpretations: Seaton's well-meant reforms were popular with many Ionians, but they did lead ultimately to the

¹⁰⁰ Miller, p. 632.

¹⁰¹ 'Editorial', *Times*, 17 September 1849, p. 4.

¹⁰² Bowen to Murray, 12 Oct 1852, JMA, MS.40136.

¹⁰³ Papanicolas, pp. xxxvii, 146.

¹⁰⁴ Calligas, 'Lord Seaton's Reforms in the Ionian Islands, 1843-48: A Race With Time', *European History Quarterly*, 24 (1994), 7-29 (p. 24).

¹⁰⁵ Knox, *The British Protectorate*, p. 114.

demise of the protectorate. As Sakis Gekas asserts, they paved the way for the radical unionist politics that ultimately ended it.¹⁰⁶

Retaliation came thundering back in a lengthy anonymous review of Bowen's pamphlet in the *Edinburgh Review*, Whig rival to the Tory *Quarterly Review*.¹⁰⁷ This dismissed Bowen's pamphlet for having been dictated by vindictive feelings, and defended Seaton's reforms, declaring that his only fault had been to employ the frightful University vice-chancellor. Within weeks of arriving in Corfu, Bowen had 'checked, interrupted and disturbed [...] the educationary current' and was universally agreed to be unfit for the job.¹⁰⁸ Bowen disgusted the Ionians with his 'extravagant and uncontrollable garrulity and absurdity', which cost him the respect necessary to teach. Seaton, it transpires, wrote the review himself.¹⁰⁹ Again we see the power of the individual at work, undermining the straightforward dichotomy of unified colonial powers against radical nationalists.

Partly because of his personal support for Ward, in 1854 Bowen was promoted to Chief Secretary. Anglo-Ionian relations continued to deteriorate and in 1857 Ward's successor John Young sent the Colonial Office a secret dispatch arguing that Britain's position had become untenable and that to prevent more embarrassment the southernmost islands should be ceded to Greece, and Corfu and Paxos annexed by Britain. It was a reprise of Bowen's pamphlet. Bowen added two pages of his own and claimed that 'all men of substance & respectability in this island [Corfu] desire [annexation to Britain] in their hearts'.¹¹⁰ Corfu's Ionian Attorney General Demitrios Curcumelli concurred and sent a similar secret dispatch.¹¹¹ Although supported by Palmerston, Gladstone rejected the proposal because of its potential complications, and the fact that he regarded possessing territory beyond British shores without strong reason as disadvantageous.¹¹² Colonial Secretary Edward Bulwer Lytton dismissed the

¹⁰⁶ Sakis Gekas, *Xenocracy: State, Class and Colonialism in the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2016), p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ 'The Ionian Islands Under British Protection', *Edinburgh Review*, CXCVII, Jan-April 1853, pp. 41-87.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 75.

¹⁰⁹ Knox, *The British Protectorate*, p. 114.

¹¹⁰ Bowen to Merivale, 30 Aug 1858, CO 136/161.

¹¹¹ Knox, *The British Protectorate*, p. 115.

¹¹² Gladstone to Bowen, 2 Feb 1855, BM MSS, qtd in Temperley, p. 50, and Add MSS 44530.

proposal, believing that the radical nationalists would be appeased by reforms.¹¹³ He persuaded Gladstone, a philhellene, classical scholar, lover of political freedom and currently out of office, to visit the Ionians to assess the situation and resolve issues of bad governance with Bowen as his escort.¹¹⁴ But while Gladstone was en route, Bowen and Young's secret dispatch was leaked to the *Daily News*. Publication fell 'like a thunderbolt', outraging unionists who wanted Corfu to be included in any cession, and protectionists who wanted to retain the status quo but with reforms.¹¹⁵ Gladstone was embarrassed, Young vilified, and Bowen blamed by both sides. Bowen's nemesis Papanicolas derided him in the *Morning Chronicle* as a 'silly though malicious mover of mischief [...] holding a high appointment, into which he has been foisted by peculiar patronage in a manner most offensive to the Ionian people'.¹¹⁶

However, although evidently still at personal loggerheads, again Bowen and Papanicolas were not as divided along adversarial lines as might appear. Ward's successor John Young was surprised by how often Bowen's thoughts and inclinations turned to Greece.¹¹⁷ Young conceded that it was natural in someone who had studied, talked and written about Greece so extensively, but nonetheless criticised Bowen's '*couleur de rose* views of Greece and Grecians'.¹¹⁸ Bowen attempted to unite the two sides by marrying the daughter of Candiano Roma, the President of the Ionian Senate. However, Young, who had encouraged this dynastic marriage, now complained that Bowen was too closely entwined with 'a numerous needy family actively engaged in the struggles'.¹¹⁹ Bowen's erstwhile friend Edward Lear accused him of becoming 'the verist tool of Greek factionaries', and nicknamed him 'the sieve' for leaking government measures to the Ionians.¹²⁰ Lear dreaded losing his Ionian home should the islands be surrendered to Greece, and railed against Bowen: 'Every effort is being made by the Gks to use their wretched tool as much as possible [...] - & if the madness of statesmen

¹¹³ Holland and Markides, p. 19.

¹¹⁴ Knox, *The British Protectorate*, p. 118.

¹¹⁵ Young to Carnarvon, 23 Nov 1858, Carnarvon Papers, BL, Add MS 60783.

¹¹⁶ 5 August 1857, CO 136/160.

¹¹⁷ Young to Labouchere, 23 Dec 1856, BM Add MSS 62940.

¹¹⁸ Young to Labouchere, 20 April 1856, BM Add MSS 62940.

¹¹⁹ Young to Labouchere 10 Aug 1857, BM Add MSS 62940.

¹²⁰ Lear to Fortescue, 11 Jan 1857; 1 May 1857, Fortescue Papers, Somerset Heritage, DD/SH 337.

or rather their indifference, allows him to stay on here, he will be forced to cause every English influence to cease & he will end by aiding the Gk gang'.¹²¹

Gladstone felt compelled to demonstrate that union with Greece was out of the question, so in 1859 sacrificed Bowen and Young. They were sacked, and dispatched as far away as possible, Bowen to govern Queensland, and Young to govern New South Wales. Bowen asked Gladstone to present his move as a promotion, because he feared the Ionians (doubtless Papanicolas in particular) would claim he was punished for having married one of *them*, and use it to attack Britain for being anti-Ionian. Gladstone found this credible, given that 'some not unimportant persons here make it a point not to admit an Ionian within their doors'.¹²² Thus Bowen's history demonstrates the important role of individuals in shifting global spheres of influence.

No one, however, was appeased. Calligas shows that in the late 1850s Ionian radicalism placed less emphasis on socio-political reform than on pure unionism, thereby boosting its popularity across social classes. The radical nationalist minority grew louder than the moderate majority, sidelining 'old' reformist radicals like Papanicolas who opposed *enosis* but were nevertheless still considered heroes 'by a rather bewildered popular following'.¹²³ Gekas argues that the ten-year battle for union owed more to the constitutional struggle than the 'rather timid' Ionian mobilisation; this was about attitudes rather than actions.¹²⁴ The Ionian attitude was that any government was welcome, constitutional or not, so long as it was Greek, and in 1864 the final LHC Henry Storks surrendered to nationalism and ceded all the islands to Greece.

To conclude, the publications examined here led to an international spat, tarnished reputations, increased hostility between two nations and caused the expulsion of the LHC and his Chief Secretary. In an early form of decolonisation, they hastened the independence of one state from a much larger bloc and its union with a much smaller and less powerful 'mother country', thereby helping to shape the development of the British empire and the Greek nation, influencing British-Greek relations, and contributing to the evolution of nineteenth-century Europe. In his pamphlet Bowen had predicted that in the end the Ionian question would come down

¹²¹ Lear to Fortescue, 18 June 1858, DD/SH 337.

¹²² Gladstone to Newcastle, 25 Nov 1858, BM Add MSS 44550.

¹²³ Calligas, *Rizospastai*, p. 1.

¹²⁴ Gekas, pp. 2, 13.

to money: 'The cool, calculating genius of Great Britain will always weigh with careful anxiety all questions affecting her commerce'.¹²⁵ However, equally significant in this case was the power of the press, politics and people. The pamphlets demonstrate the growing political and moral power of nationalism and the press, and connections between them. Above all, they articulate the complexities of the clash between 'protector' and 'protected', which did not always conform to a simple narrative of 'oppressive coloniser' versus 'radical nationalist', and remind us of how unmapped and personality-driven geopolitics can be.



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¹²⁵ Bowen, *IIUBP*, p. 138.